

How did Lula win despite his disadvantages in Brazil? The second beginning of populism

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Abstract

As a result of the Brazilian presidential election on October 30, 2022, Lula became president for the third time, changing the Bolsonaro regime in Brazil.

In the first round of the election on Oct. 2, many polls suggested a clear win for Lula, who received 48% of the vote compared to Bolsonaro's 43%.

This short article discusses with an externally neutral perspective how Lula won the presidential election despite Lula's significant disadvantages, Bolsonaro's use of state facilities, and how sociological influences developed.

Keywords: Brazil Election, Bolsonaro, Lula, Sociological Effects on Election, Populism

Introduction

Advantages(A) and disadvantages(D) of Lula and Bolsonaro

Bolsonaro's advantages or disadvantages.

1. Deforestation rates increased by 60% in the first three years of Bolsonaro's presidency (D).
2. Rejected vaccine manufacturers' early offers to supply the country, Brazil was one of the worst epidemic countries (D).
3. He used all state resources for himself and his relatives(A+D).
4. He mobilized for elections, regardless of the means at hand (A).
5. He was the President during the election (A).
6. Not aware of the troubles experienced as a person living in wealth (D).

Lula's advantages or disadvantages.

1. A heavy smoker for years, Lula was treated with chemotherapy for throat cancer in 2011, deepening his gruff baritone (D).
2. Lula is 77 years old(D).
3. He was President from 2003-2010(A+D).
4. Imprisoned in 2018, but the conviction was later thrown out. Lula was on trial for receiving real estate and other gifts as bribes from engineering firms snagged in the graft probe. He was convicted in 2017 and sentenced to 9-1/2 years in prison (D).

5. The former president was freed after 19 months, and Brazil's Supreme Court annulled his convictions because of improper jurisdiction after the judge overseeing his prosecution was found partial. Lula always denied the charges and said his enemies had framed him to remove him from Brazilian politics (A+D).
6. His presidency also reinvigorated Brazil's oil and ship-building industries, while its economy rose to the sixth largest in the world. Brazil's global prestige hit new levels as it was chosen to host the Olympics and the soccer World Cup (A).
7. However, Lula's legacy was tarnished amid revelations of a vast kickback scheme on public contracts, benefiting leaders from major political parties, including his own. That and a deep 2015-2016 recession-built momentum for the impeachment of his hand-picked successor, former President Dilma Rousseff (A+D).
8. Lula pledged to "rebuild Brazil"—that is, restore public services battered by years of underinvestment, use Brazil's fossil fuel resources to lower domestic energy prices and battle inflation, and help the millions of Brazilians struggling with food insecurity (A).
9. Critics say Lula's campaign relied mainly on nostalgia and that the former President has refused to share details of the economic plan that will underpin his vision for Brazil. "I am the only candidate with whom people

should not be concerned about economic policy,” he said (A)

10. He was a President twice already. He did not discuss economic policies before winning the elections. He said, “First, we have to win the elections” (A+D). (reuters.com 2022, aa.com.tr 2022).

As you can see, there is much more to be said for Lula. Lula occupied the agenda more, and Bolsonaro, unfortunately, could not set the agenda. Another critical issue is that Bolsonaro failed to deliver a positive message to the public. Most of the messages that excited the public came from Lula. This sociologically made Lula stronger despite all his disadvantages.

How and Why did Lula win?

The Opposition's primary role is to question the government of the day and hold them accountable to the public. This also helps to fix the mistakes of the Ruling Party or Leader. The Opposition is equally responsible for upholding the best interests of the people of the country.

Bolsonaro's approach to COVID-19, combined with his attacks on Brazil's democracy, allowed the former President to command a broad unity coalition against him, including his former political rivals. Geraldo Alckmin, a center-right former São Paulo Governor Lula's rival in the 2006 election, will be his Vice President. Lula moderated his left-wing image in the campaign's final stage, swapping the bright red colors of his Workers Party for white clothing while making more biblical references as he reached out to Brazil's growing evangelical Christian community. The attempt to work with his opponent, who had an opposing view, created a positive atmosphere in the electorate.

While Brazil was 37th in the economic complexity index (ECI) in 2015, it ranked 38th in 2016, 40th in 2018, and 47th in 2020. The decline in the economic complexity index is essential in showing the negative change in the industrial load in the economy. This decline has been an important issue affecting the election. Lula, a metal worker, knows what industry means in the country much better than Bolsonaro and has dealt with this issue very effectively.

Lula's next government will face a much more challenging economic landscape than his first one in the early 2000s. For eight years, Brazil has been staminal from one financial crisis to the next. Global economic turmoil from the war in Ukraine is driving up energy prices, while a years-long drought is curbing production in the crucial agricultural sector.

The most important export materials of Brasil are iron ore (%12.3), crude petroleum 9.3%, soybean 13.4%, raw soya 4.2%, corn 2.8%, and coffee 2.4%. The fastest growing export market between 2019-2020 is China, with 71%, after China, Singapore, with 36.6%, and Canada, with a 24.2% increase. Brazil exports mainly to China 31.7% and USA 10.2% (oec.world/en/profile/country/brazil, 2021). In addition to this commercial affinity, the Brazilian leader Bolsonaro, who has the same perspective on the world and problems, has brought American President Trump closer.

Political alignment with the United States became essential to Brazilian foreign policy once Bolsonaro came to power. While close ties to Washington had already been established, far-right ideological synergies between Bolsonaro and Donald Trump became more highly visible. A common anticommunism stance interlinked with antiglobalism reflected commonalities in regional politics and a pronounced strengthening of defense and security ties.

However, Bolsonaro–Trump's common worldviews did not spill over into Brazilian international economics. While political relations with the United States were important, Brazil's investment and trade ties with China were maintained and expanded.

To make sense of Brazil–United States relations, two elucidatory paths are drawn—a comparative historical overview that traces the last moments of bilateral ideological synergies to evaluate the exceptional character of Bolsonaro–Trump bilateralism; and contextualization within the process of redistribution of world power intertwined with the rise of China, which has deeply affected the leadership capacity of the United States (Hirstlia, 2022).

Through semi-structured interviews and content analysis of business primary sources, despite significant heterogeneities within and between economic sectors, agribusiness and manufacturing entrepreneurs were more critical of than complimentary toward the nature and directions of Bolsonaro's foreign policy.

The business lobbying was successful in several issues, including keeping the South American economic integration project alive, containing the close association between Bolsonaro and Benjamin Netanyahu's Israel, and limiting the economic and political consequences of the Brazil–China diplomatic crises. Despite their achievements, business leaders were less successful in moderating and much less changing Bolsonaro's approach toward the environment and climate change, which constituted a significant predicament for the country's image abroad and played a crucial role in obstructing the ratification of a trade deal with the European Union. Still, these negative implications were insufficient to produce any severe split between business groups and the Bolsonaro administration during the first three years of Bolsonaro's rule (Loureriro, 2022).

Historically, Brazilian diplomacy has centered its foreign policy strategy on multilateral institutions. Due to Brazil's modest military capability, multilateralism has been an instrument to share the political costs of international decisions and a defensive mechanism. Bolsonaro's conservative project is constructed at the intersection between domestic politics and the international system. He employs an ideology of anticommunism, antiglobalism, and negationism to assure the loyalty of specific constituencies despite potential disruptions to collective interests and long-term national strategies (bbc.com/news/world-Latin-America, 2022).

Brazilian diplomatic capacities and their influence on foreign policy during Bolsonaro's administration. Academics and practitioners once recognized the Brazilian diplomatic service for

its high skills, regardless of the foreign policy guidelines in force (Pinheiro, 2022).

Looking at Lula's general profile and rhetoric, he looks like a populist leader. The sentence "let us win first" summarizes his thoughts on the economy. He did not say much about what to do. It would be a dream to expect too much from him at work.

Conclusion

The votes that the voters cast by predicting the ideologies are not always beneficial for the country. People do not care much whether they choose people who think like them or whether they contribute to the country or not.

It is hard to imagine that people who have entirely given up on the habit of self-direction can successfully choose those who should lead them. We cannot make anyone believe that a liberal, vigorous, and intelligent government will emerge with the votes of a people made up of servants (de Tocqueville, 2020).

Sociopsychological in the eyes of the public, Bolsonaro did not lose the presidency in the last presidential elections; Bolsonaro lost when Trump, whom he leaned on, lost the presidential election. Bolsonaro could not use the advantages he had in the elections. The most important of these advantages were not the state facilities he had but the disadvantages of Lula (time.com, 2022).

The critical issue is the analysis of the sociological structures of the people of the country-specific to that country. Bolsonaro has not studied the sociological structure of the Brazilian people and the sociological factors that affect voter behavior. For this reason, each country should analyze the dominant sociological factors of its electorate well. Otherwise, the fact that Lula won against Bolsonaro is the other upcoming election.

Whether democrats, socialists, or conservatives are elected in many parts of the world, there is no significant change except for some basic approaches such as climate change and welfare state approaches, and it does not contribute much to the quality of life of citizens who are voters. From this point of view, there is not much change in countries, whether demagogues or populist rulers are left-wing or right-wing.

When we look at the political picture in Brazil, it seems that the power has found another populist leader, whether their ideologies are. In this case, we can say that it is not the end of populism but a second beginning.

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